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Abstract—The Internet of Things (IoT) is intended for ubiq-
uitous connectivity among different entities or “things”. While
its purpose is to provide effective and efficient solutions, security
of the devices and network is a challenging issue. The number
of devices connected along with the ad-hoc nature of the system
further exacerbates the situation. Therefore, security and privacy
has emerged as a significant challenge for the IoT. In this paper,
we aim to provide a thorough survey related to the privacy and
security challenges of the IoT. This document addresses these
challenges from the perspective of technologies and architecture
used. This work focuses also in IoT intrinsic vulnerabilities as well
as the security challenges of various layers based on the security
principles of data confidentiality, integrity and availability. This
survey analyzes articles published for the IoT at the time and
relates it to the security conjuncture of the field and its projection
to the future.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, Security, Privacy, Embedded
Devices, Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability
I. INTRODUCTION
THE essence of the Internet of Things (IoT) is the conceptof every device blending with the existence of human
beings. It is the state wherein there is no distinguishable
difference between the operation of devices surrounding us
and our actions. This means that devices become part of our
experience. There is a seamless integration between us and
the “things” around us. The various devices communicate
intelligently with one another to execute daily operations.
There is minimal human intervention for the operation of
devices. Every device is connected to every other device,
communication with one another, transferring data, retriev-
ing data and intelligently responding, triggering actions. The
successful implementation of the IoT involves consideration
of a huge number of aspects. These involve the technology
used for communication, various communication protocols
which form the backbone of the IoT, standards to be used for
communication, hardware and embedded devices used to build
the hardware, the software, operating system that is compatible
with hardware and the protocols being used. By the end of
2020 it is said that there would be around 20 billion connected
devices [1]. The data exchanged over the network will be
greater than 40 Zettabytes for the same period [2]. This brings
up an important discussion regarding all the data generated,
stored or transmitted by IoT devices, its security and how this
1. Diego Mendez is with Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, 47907.
E-mail: dmendezm@purdue.edu
2. I. Papapanagiotou is with Netflix Inc., Los Gatos, CA 95032 and Purdue
University, West Lafayette, IN, 47907.
E-mail: ipapapa@ncsu.edu
3. Baijian Yang is with Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, 47907.
E-mail: byang@purdue.edu
relates to the privacy of the users. Every approach of IoT
system must be secure and provide the necessary controls
and privacy to the users. Successful implementation of an
IoT system is possible only when the systems are built with
security as one of the central aspects of the IoT. This paper
discusses the security issues at different levels of the IoT
system. It presents an exhaustive survey of security and privacy
issues existing in IoT systems, its enabling technologies and
protocols. This paper elaborates on the current status of the
field, providing the big picture based on IoT Architecture,
analyzes the security challenges and vulnerabilities of the
different underlying technologies and protocols, discusses the
IoT security concerns under the security triad perspective
and explores the current privacy issues of IoT systems under
different points of view. Finally, summarizes the content to
give a clear perception of the ongoing security challenges of
the IoT and overlays some solutions.
II. STRUCTURE OF IOT SYSTEMS
The IoT heterogeneous essence, dynamics, intelligence,
mobility and undefined perimeters makes it a high-demand
technology domain but also makes the IoT vulnerable and
risky under security terms. The different platforms where the
IoT is available makes it even more difficult for security
researchers to find comprehensive solutions to the current
security challenges. Therefore, the importance of understand-
ing the foundation and the components of the IoT becomes
paramount.
The foundation for ubiquitous computing, whose goal is to
connect everyday life objects to the network using technolog-
ical platforms, is made up of three components [3]:
(a) Hardware
(b) Middleware
(c) Presentation
Also, the same pattern can be observed when determining the
paradigms of the IoT, according to [4] and [3] three factors
can be attributed to the IoT environment, those are:
(a) Internet-oriented
(b) Things-oriented
(c) Semantic-oriented
Therefore, the same concept can be applied to the IoT struc-
ture. The IoT architecture, according to [5] is composed of
three layers:
(a) The perception layer
(b) The network layer
(c) The application layer
The perception layer gathers environmental data, the network
layer, which is composed of wired and wireless systems,
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Fig. 1. Current IoT Architecture Frameworks/Standards
processes and transmits the input obtained by the perception
layer supported by technological platforms. The application
layer consists of abstracted solutions that interact with the
final users in order to satisfy their needs. The IoT requires
architectural solutions that can manage heterogeneous states
in order to work efficiently and effectively [6]. Figure 1
summarizes current IoT architecture frameworks/standards and
highlights their security objectives.
However, there is no unified view of the IoT framework.
Some engineering bodies, including the IEEE and ETSI,
have issued technology-specific standards including security
guidelines [5]. These standardization efforts have also brought
up other initiatives for unified architecture and modeling,
for instance the Reference Architecture Model Industrie 4.0
(RAMI 4.0) [7], the Industrial Internet Reference Architecture
(IIRA) [8] and the Internet of Things - Architecture (IoT-A)
[9]. Architecture and model implementation helps IoT devel-
opers to focus and structure their efforts on users’ require-
ments, which include connectivity, device management, data
collection and analysis, scalability and security. Nevertheless,
additional unification attempts are needed for simplification,
always taking security communications as the main actor and
enabler of IoT initiatives [6]. Besides the industrial domain,
the scientific community has been a main contributor of the
standardization of IoT protocols and technology as well [4].
The author of [10] advocates for the need of a security-based
architecture, which is lacking at the moment, where resiliency,
authentication access restriction and privacy are important
requirements for the future. Also, the authors of [11] back a
reliable architecture that address security and service requests.
From a different perspective, the authors of [12] promote the
importance of robust and reliable standards to conduct shielded
IoT architectures, currently required with insistence from the
security community.
III. VULNERABLE LANDSCAPE
Security issues of IoT devices occur in different instances
which include technological, ethical and privacy concerns.
In October 2016, the massive Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attack on Dyn - a company that controls much of
the Internets domain name system (DNS) infrastructure -
by a botnet army of IoT infected devices, has turned on
the alarms on the consequences that faulty IoT protections
and poor standards can motivate [13] which accentuates the
need for additional research on the IoT security domain.
Nevertheless, the number of publications addressing security
issues and concerns for the expanding Internet of Things has
not foster the same attention to scientists in the community,
even though the number of publications for IoT technologies
and applications has grown exponentially during the last five
years [14]. Figure 3 shows a basic comparison of the number
of publications for both subjects. In despite of the issues
presented above, there is some important discussion taking
place between experts about what the baseline for secure IoT
systems. For instance, according to [15], IoT devices demand
the following set of security requirements in order to be
considered as secure :
• Secure authentication
• Secure bootstrapping and transmission of data
• Security of IoT data
• Secure access to data by authorized persons
Weber [16], has also determined similar security requirements
for the Internet of Things, which include: (a) attack resiliency,
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Fig. 2. Internet of Things Security Landscape.
(b) data authentication, (c) access control, and finally demand
(d) client Privacy. Also, [5] proposes security requirements to
protect IoT data transmission, which include the following:
(a) key management, (b) appropriate secret key algorithms, (c)
secure routing protocols, (d) intrusion detection technology,
(e) authentication and access control, and finally, (f) physical
security design.
For [17], [18], the two main security related issues have to
do with data integrity and authentication. At the moment, the
security and privacy requirements face serious challenges since
current technologies do not offer feasible and comprehensive
solutions applicable to the nature of the IoT. The unique
scalability and distribution properties of the Internet of Things
call for flexible and innovative security frameworks that can
close the existing gaps and reduce the risk associated with
the use of embedded computing devices. The energy-efficient
principle as well as the low computing properties of IoT
devices are antagonistic to the essence of cryptography
algorithms of current security protocols, determined as the
”security processing gap” according to [19]. IoT devices are
also exposed to physical tampering, war driving, malicious
software and side-channel attacks [19].
Security problems of the Internet of Things need to be
understood in order to find an appropriate solution (Figure
2). The vulnerable landscape can be scrutinized from an
architectural perspective; the perception, the network and the
application layer present security problems of their own that
need to be addressed as a whole. In section IV these layers
are discussed in detail. Additionally, some other issues arise
when the IoT platform is looked from a different technical
perspective. For instance, [20] states that 55% of Samsung-
owned SmartThings development platform applications are
overprivileged and therefore present important security risks.
IV. ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES AND PROTOCOLS
The Internet of Things (IoT) may be powered by different
technologies with different properties for distinctive applica-
tions. However, those technologies also bring up some security
issues that need to be addressed based on the capabilities and
constrains that IoT devices offer at each IoT layer. This paper
presents the following security concerns based on the IoT
threat model presented by [21], and specifically related to the
external adversary entity. The authors of [21, p. 38] refer to
the external adversary as: “An outside entity that is not part of
the system and has no authorized access to it. An adversary
would try to gain information about the user of the system
for malicious purposes such as causing financial damage and
undermining the users credibility. Also, causing malfunction
to the system by manipulating the sensing data”.
A. Perception Layer
1) Wireless Sensor Networks: The authors in [22, p.65]
defined Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) “as a group of
independent nodes communicating wirelessly offer limited
frequency and bandwidth”, which in order to perform suc-
cessfully depend on a massive deployment and strict coordi-
nation. The limitations of WSN include “power management,
network discovery, control and routing, collaborative signal
and information processing, tasking and queering, and secu-
rity”. According to [3] the WSN network module include the
following components:
(a) Hardware
(b) Communication stack
(c) Middleware
(d) Secure data Aggregation
Similar to active Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tech-
nology, the data collected by the sensor nodes is shared
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Fig. 3. Number of publications for Internet-of-Things and Internet-of-Things Security related articles. As of December 2016 [14].
between them or by a centralized system for analytic purposes
[3].
A WSN is composed of the following elements:
(a) Sensor
(b) Micro-controller
(c) Memory
(d) Radio transceiver
(e) Battery
A WSN consists of a centralize base station that controls
a multi-hub relay system that connects the source nodes
and the base [23]. WSNs, as well as other network appli-
cations, require measures against common attacks and rises
which include Denial of Service (DoS), traffic analysis, node
replication (Sybil attack), general confidentiality concerns,
black hole routing attacks and physical damage / unauthorized
manipulation [22]. [22, p.66] also mention the necessity of a
”common communication protocol” in order to find a feasible
solution for system protection at the application level which
includes IEEE 802.15.4 Security, Zigbee and Tiny OS proto-
cols. Moreover, some security requirements are set in order to
consider WSN nodes as secure, which include:
• Data confidentiality
• Integrity
• Freshness
• Availability
• Organization autonomy
• Authentication
WSNs vulnerabilities, according to [23], can be categorized
as the following: (a) attacks on secrecy and authentication, (b)
silent attacks on service integrity and (c) attacks on network
availability. Availability attacks (DoS) against WSN devises
can occur on different layers of the network including DoS
attacks on the physical layer (jamming, node tampering),
DoS attacks on the link layer (collision, unfairness, battery
exhaustion), DoS attacks on the network layer (spoofing,
hello flood, homing, selective forwarding, sybil, wormhole,
acknowledgement flooding), DoS attacks on the transport
layer (flooding, de-synchronization) and DoS attacks on the
application layer (traffic congestion generation). Attacks on
WSN can further be classified on to one of the following
categories: (a) external, (b) internal, (c) passive, (d) active, (e)
mote-class, (f) laptop class, (g) interruption, (h) interception,
(i) modification, (j) fabrication, (k) host-based and (l) network-
based [23].
Authors of [24] affirm that work has been done to secure WSN,
however, some questioning has been arising. The questioning
involves adaptability to the heterogeneous properties of IoT
devices, network layer security management determination,
feasibility of re-utilization of existing encryption protocols
and end-to-end integrity verification. The authors also mention
some additional efforts that include lightweight encryption
methods, such as Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), to
protect privacy and avoid counterfeiting attempts, which re-
quire additional standardization efforts to meet confidentiality
expectations of the IoT infrastructure.
WSN security concerns can be addressed in some aspects,
by the use of authentication methods through Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI), to prevent rogue node data injection, and
authorization technologies to mitigate DoS risks [25].
According to [22], node authentication can solve most of the
problems that may be caused by unauthorized uses, some of
the authentication methods disused take into account SPINS,
composed of Secure Network Encryption Protocol (SNEP),
micro-Tesla, TINYSEC, Localized Encryption and Authenti-
cation Protocol (LEAP/LEAP+) and Zigbee.
2) Radio Frequency Identification: Radio Frequency identi-
fication (RFID) implementations provide unique identification
based on passive tags to the items they are attached to.
The data transmitted from the scan reading is commonly
“unprotected or read-only” [25, p.391], including Ultra High
Frequency (UHF) and Global Gen-2 tags under default set-
tings. RFID passive tagging, by default, permits reading by any
compliant scanner with no authentication at all, increasing ears
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dropping risks and relegating passive RFID solutions to non
critical settings [25]. RFID vulnerabilities can be classified as
the following: (a) attacks on authenticity, i.e. unauthorized tag
disabling, (b) attacks on integrity, i.e. unauthorized tag cloning,
(c) attacks on confidentiality, i.e. unauthorized tag tracking
and (d) attacks on availability, i.e. replay attacks [23]. Also,
Corporate espionage risks, location as well as personal privacy
concerns may be affected by the use of unprotected tags [26].
Usually, many RFID implementations are exposed to physical
and traffic analysis attacks [27], based on their autonomous
properties, RFID devices respond automatically to readers’
requests makes them inherently vulnerable [28]. Back in
2004 and 2005, proof-of-concept attacks have been published
against RFID financial transactions disclosures as well as
cryptographic keys brute-forcing for widely deployed RFID
tags [29]. Even Advanced Encrypted Scheme (AES) RFID
solutions may present security vulnerabilities a those devices,
based on the passive power capabilities, are susceptible to
“fault induction, timing attacks or power analysis attacks” [26,
p.203].
Zhao & Ge [5] provide security measures to secure RFID
communications, which include: (a) access control, that pro-
tect RFID tags against reading at will, (b) data encryption,
which include non-linear key algorithms, (c) IPSec protocol
utilization, (d) cryptography technology scheme, to protect
against side-channel attacks, i.e. Differential Power Analysis
(DPA) attacks by eliminating ”data dependencies of the energy
consumption” and also by obscuring the encryption process
values based on randomization [5, p.666], however, DPA
attacks are not protocol-dependent as it may be used against
other communication procedures. [28] has also presented a
new lightweight implementation using the recent SHA-3 ap-
pointed function Keccak-f(200) and Keccak-f(400) to secure
RFID applications through hashing functions. [27] proposes
more simple solutions based on ”tag killing”, which is not
satisfactory, and ”Blinded Tree-Walking” to take advantage the
backward channels to prevent eavesdropping attacks. Never-
theless, both approaches do not address location privacy issues.
[27] also presents ”Blocker Tags” solutions to provide user
privacy by blocking readers’ requests using the anti-collision
algorithm embedded in RFID systems to differentiate between
tags. Other solutions propose ciphertext re-encryption to hide
communication appearance by using encryption-capable tags
which usually do not offer a cost-effective solution [27]. [29]
promotes the development of security standards not only for
emerging RFID technologies to address security issues but also
to solve other interaction issues, which can be seen as a win-
win situation for not-security-focused developers. [26] also
proposes a hashed based access control by using hardware-
optimized functions as well as randomized access control to
prevent user tracking by using hash functions and random
number generators in order to control the predictability of
responses from RFID tags.
3) 802.11: The current IEEE 802.11 standard, 802.11ac
or 802.11n i.e. Wi-Fi is wireless Local Area Networking
technology that connects electronic devices within the range
of 100m to the network. IEEE has developed 802.11ah Task
Group that is focused on developing a wireless communication
standard based on 802.11 which is suitable for the specific
needs of IoT systems. The main intent of the task group is
to eliminate the existing capability and capacity gaps. IEEE
802.11 networks are vulnerable, as any other wireless network,
to easily performed passive attacks, including eavesdropping
just armed with suitable receiving antennas [30]. However,
active attacks can be performed as well by exploiting protocol
and hardware vulnerabilities including jamming and scram-
bling attacks [31]. The current 802.11ah development and
design requirements also try to implement security based on
the properties of IoT devices, such as constrained memory and
limited power supply, in order to include them in early stages
to ensure proper functioning when fully deployed [32].
4) Long Term Evolution (LTE)/LTE-Advanced: IoT Sys-
tems depend on gateways to reach the Internet in an efficient
way, for areas where the wired gateways are not an option
usually Long Term Evolution (LTE) devices are chosen to
fulfill that purpose based on bandwidth, coverage and spectrum
efficiency [33]. LTE Femtocells, which are used as low-range
and low-power radio bases designed for small scale users or
systems, provide the connection to the core cellular network.
Such low-tier cells level the ground that eventually fosters
the spread use of LTE and its significance [34]. According
to [34], “Security and Privacy in such networks is achieved
at several levels in their air architectures, such as the air
interface, the operator’s internal network and the inter-operator
links” [34, p. 1]. As any other wireless technology, LTE
networks are susceptible to passive and active attacks, although
some active attacks can be controlled by the use of cryp-
tographic tools. Passive attacks, such as traffic analysis and
accurate user tracking are nearly impossible to contain [34].
Femtocells are also vulnerable to tampering as attackers may
found them easier to access that any other LTE infrastructure,
which can lead to undetected privacy exposure. Moreover,
Femtocells are exposed to other kind of attacks, including
impersonation, false reporting of location that may affect the
normal operation of the device [34]. Exposure of public IP
addresses of gateways, such as Femtocells, could leave the
LTE core network vulnerable to internet-originated attacks,
such as DoS, DDoS and impersonation attacks as well [34].
Some solutions proposed to address identity and location
tracking is by the implementation of adaptive schemes that
change the identifiable information based on the context of
the communication or by demand of the user [34].
5) WiMax: While the technology has lost its popularity, it
can still be used to connect different IoT devices particularly
in metropolitan areas. The higher data rate accompanied by
longer range can certainly facilitate different entities partic-
ularly in remote areas. IEEE 802.16 security specifications
reside primarily within the MAC layer, such specifications
reside on what is called a ’security’ or ’privacy’ sublayer [35],
therefore, the physical layer remains mainly unprotected [36].
Some of the security concerns associated with WiMAX are
jamming at physical layer that can result in denial of service
[36] or network mapping by eavesdropping [37]. Nevertheless,
the MAC layer also presents security issues such as Man-in-
the-middle attacks, caused by rogue Base Station (BS) that
pretends to be a legitimate BS, replay attacks and Denial
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or downgrade of service due to flawed authentication and
resource limitation, which includes cryptographic computer
efficiency constraints [38]. [39] proposes the incorporation of
additional schemes for authentication and key distribution that
nevertheless still have efficiency issues to be improved before
becoming introducing into real applications.
6) Near Field Communication: Near Field Communication
(NFC) has a short range of 20 centimeters, however it can
be used for wide range of services in IoT systems such
as payments, authentication, data exchange, etc. From the
security perspective, NFC is also prone to a number of threats
including Denial of Service (DOS), and information leakage
[40]. The major security issue with NFC is that for some cases
it is not encrypted, i.e. to maintain backward compatibility
with RFID. Therefore, it results in security vulnerability as
the wireless signal generated by the devices can be picked
up by antennas [41]. NFC is also prone to eavesdropping
in active mode. It is possible as well to implement an NFC
skimmer device that could listen to the NFC communication
between any two near-by devices. The data could be stored
and collected later just like many ATM devices. It can also be
manipulated by interfering with the data channel making the
data corrupted and useless when it arrives at the destination.
Similarly, the NFC tag can be modified by potential attackers
who can replace the original tag with a fraudulent one with
the intent to steal valuable user information. [42] proposes
a security model for NFC that provides conditional privacy
protection. This method is based on the use of random public
keys like pseudonyms. These keys are generated based on
the long-term key issued by the Trusted Service Manager.
This suggested method can protect user’s identity and provide
conditional privacy.
7) Bluetooth: Bluetooth is certainly a viable technology
for IoT systems. It has already been adopted for indoor
proximity systems in form of iBeacons [43]. Due to its range
and data throughput, it can also be used in different sensor
networks for various tasks such as earthquake monitoring.
The Bluetooth protocol it is designed to provide security
in 3 ways: (1) use of pseudo-random frequency hoping, (2)
Restricted authentication and (3) Encryption [44]. Even though
the generic access protocol of Bluetooth make possible three
security modes: (1) Non-Secure, (2) Service-levels security
and (3) Link-level security, there are still security concerns
that need to be addressed. [45] lists some vulnerabilities
that persists even after the security features have been in-
troduced, which includes optional or weak encryption, non-
secure default settings, weak PIN use, insecure unit keys,
flawed integrity protections and predictable number genera-
tion. Bluetooth is also prone to a number of threats including
eavesdropping, Man-In-The-Middle attacks, data corruption,
and denial of service. Attackers have also paid attention to
vehicle IoT Bluetooth pairing applications and devices making
them a valuable target that need to be secured [46], [47].
Nevertheless, [44] proposes some simple solutions that address
some of the security flaws, which include: User understand-
ing of the technology, centralized Bluetooth pairing policy
implementation, use of non-discoverable mode or on-demand
access/pairing and mandatory encryption use. Bluetooth has
also been used for microlocation purposes through beacons
enabled by Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) technology [48],
[49] or proximity applications [50]. BLE communication is
conformed by the interchange of small data packets which
are broadcast, one-way only, within an specific time [51]. As
expected, the data processed by beacons and BLE systems
may contain private user data that need to be protected from
intruders and from indiscriminate use [51]. BLE uses AES-128
CCM for encryption and authentication purposes [17].
8) ZigBee: Based on the IEEE standard 802.15.4, the
ZigBee protocol defines the network (NWK) layer as the one
that runs on top of the physical (PHY) and MAC layers. It also
comprehends descriptions, algorithms and protocols for the
application support (APS), which outlines the device objects
(ZDO), the device profile (ZDP) and the security services.
The present security architecture consists of the ZigBeee co-
ordinator which performs network joining and key distribution
duties, here the Thrust Center concept was introduced, which
plays three roles:
• Trust manager
• Network manager
• Configuration manager
The trust manager authenticates the devices requesting to join
the network, the network manager maintains and distributes
network keys and the configuration manager provides end-to-
end security between devices [52]. ZigBee also offers two op-
eration modes, residential and commercial, where the first one
offers no security and the second one provides a centralized
key management scheme and maintains freshness counters
with other devices in the network. This gives centralized
control and the ability to update keys. The three different
types of keys are the Master key, Link Key and Network
Key. The Master Key is part of the factory-setting. They are
from the Trust Center and are the basis for long-term security
between devices. The network Keys are shared by all the
devices on the network and are the basis for security over
the entire network. The Link Key is shared by two devices
and is the basis for the security between the devices. The use
of the different keys ensures the freshness and integrity of the
data. ZigBee uses AES-128 with CCM (CCM = CBC-MAC =
Counter with Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication
Code) mode for data encryption and authentication. However,
some trade-offs must be made between security, power con-
sumption and latency (Boyle & Newe, 2008). According to
[53], Zigbee-enabled systems are susceptible to threats such
as traffic sniffing (eavesdropping), packet decoding, and data
manipulation/injection, which can be exploited by an attacker
who uses a special hardware and software developed especially
for attacking purposes. Other vulnerabilities that a ZigBee
enabled network is susceptible to are physical device damage
and key sniffing attacks.
A similar proprietary approach is brought by Z-Wave, backed
up initially by Intel and Cisco [54]. Z-Wave has an archi-
tectural similarity with Zigbee with a few differences that
makes Z-Wave a more approachable technology for home-
automation systems. According to [55], Z-Wave uses AES
encryption for secure communication, however, it presents two
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main vulnerabilities. The first one deal with the hard-coded
encryption key embedded in the Z-Wave chip, an attacker
may intercept the key exchange messages and use the hard-
coded key to unveil the content. The second one deals with the
lack of validation of the key exchange protocol handler which
can allow an attacker to inject packets to the key exchange
process and take control of the device. A security feature,
noted by [54], includes the procedure to add new devices
to the network that forces the new device to be within one
meter for set-up, which limits the attack ratio. Additionally,
as a response to recent hijacking of IoT devices the Z-Wave
Alliance has come up with the security framework S2 [56].
The alliance, fortunately, has made the implementation of
the new framework mandatory and, therefore, improved the
embedded security by strengthening the pairing process for
new devices [57].
9) Ultra-Wideband: The low power and higher precision
make it suitable for the IoT and smart architecture applications
as well including the provision of micro-location services
for tenants of IoT-equipped smart buildings. From security
perspective, literature shows the UWB is comparatively secure
and is suitable for IoT applications due to its processing power,
range, data rate and security. Indeed, it is already considered
as a viable technology for Wireless Body Area Networks
(WBANs) and can be used for a number of different services
including smart health care system. UWB signals secure and
highly reliable particularly in health applications [58].
10) IPv6 Low Power Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN):
Since the conceptualization of IoT technologies, research has
inclined to select IPv6 as the choice for wireless communi-
cation. 6LoWPAN communication standard applies IPv6 to
the PHY and MAC layer of the existing 802.15 standard.
According to Sheng, Zhengguo, et al. [59] the key features
of IPv6 which makes it suitable for the IoT are universality,
extensibility, and stability. It has special characteristics such as
small packet size, low bandwidth, and large number of devices.
According to Park, S., et al. [60] the security challenges for a
6LoWPAN network are (a) minimizing resource consumption
and maximizing security Performance, (b) 6LoWPAN deploy-
ment enables link attacks ranging from passive eavesdropping
to active interfering, (c) in-network processing involves inter-
mediate nodes in end-to-end information transfer, (d) 6LoW-
PAN communication characteristics render traditional wired
based security schemes unsuitable. 6LoWPAN is susceptible
to various attacks, the list of threats based on ISO OSI layers:
(a) 6LoWPAN devices are vulnerable to physical attacks like
node tampering, destruction and masking. Several types of
DoS attacks can be triggered at different layers. At physical
layer, jamming and and node tampering. (b) Attacks at MAC
layer include collision, battery exhaustion and unfairness. (c)
At network layer, 6LoWPAN is vulnerable to spoofing attacks
as well as altered, or replayed routing information attacks,
selective forwarding, sinkhole attack, Sybil attack, wormhole
attack, neighbor discovery attacks. (d) An attack against the
transport layer is performed by half open, half closed TCP
segment. The attacker continuously forges messages carrying
sequence numbers or control flags. This will cause the end-
points to request retransmission of missed frames leading to
DoS attack due to large amount of traffic. A secure 6LoWPAN
protocol should provide:
• Data confidentiality
• Data authentication
• Data integrity
• Data freshness
• Availability
• Robustness
• Resiliency
• Resistance
• Energy efficiency
• Assurance
To ensure maximum security 6LoWPAN should employ secure
bootstrapping mechanisms, Secure Neighbor Discovery proto-
col (SeND) extended to support Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) encryption algorithm which uses smaller-packet sizes
compared to RSA and secure key management algorithms
engineered to suit the specific characteristics of 6LoWPAN.
B. Middleware
The challenges presented by the IoT can present issues
between each one of the architectural components of em-
bedded systems, therefore, middleware has been developed
in order to interconnect and integrate all the elements that
make the IoT possible. Middleware in the IoT is used as
well to interact with “cloud technologies, centralized over-
lays, or peer to peer systems”. Evidently, the attack surface
increasing the demand for more comprehensive IoT security,
moreover, the lack of standardized approaches do not permit
a comprehensive response to all IoT security and privacy
requirements. Services such as context-awareness may risk
personal privacy as critical user information may be disclosed
by malicious parties [61]. The authors of [61, p.76] proposes
seven categories for discussion based on design principles:
1) Event-based: According to [61] all the participants in the
middleware connect through events, the events consist of a set
of parametric values that describe specific changes of state.
Some event-based middleware applications present security
features and some others do not consider security require-
ments at all. For instance, HERMES [62] utilizes a security
module that controls the perimeter based on access control, it
also provides confidentiality between brokers through X.509
certificates and OASIS role memberships. Other applications
such as EMMA, GREEN, RUNES, Steam, MiSense, PSWare
and TinyDDS do not show specific security features [61].
2) Service-oriented: [61] describes service-oriented mid-
dleware to the design approach that constructs applications
as services, similar to service-oriented computer (SOC) that
is based on service-oriented architecture (SOA) for common
Information Technology (IT) systems. Service-oriented appli-
cations include security attributes as well as vulnerabilities.
HYDRA [63] employs a security manager as part of its
management components design, each one of the components
take care of application and device elements, which have an
additional security layer. It applies a distributed security as
well as trust elements for securing inter-device connections,
it also uses virtualization to provide security and privacy,
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which according to [61] may introduce vulnerabilities for
side-channel attacks. SOCRADES [64], introduces role-based
access control for device communication with the application,
however, its security features is limited to authentication only.
UbiSOAP [65] uses some functions from its resource layer to
authenticate components for security and privacy. Servilla [66]
presents privacy concerns due to the access level it provides to
individual sensors [61]. KASOM [67], uses a security manager
which is part of one of the major subsystems, however, it offers
security by authentication only [61]. Xively [68] provides
support for end-to-end security for the entire system which
provides integrity, however, it does not provide security for its
storage components [69] same for CarrIoTs [70]. Echelon [71],
according to [61], does not include any security mechanism.
Other applications, such as SenseWrap, MUSIC, TinySOA,
SensorsMW, SENSEI, KASOM, CHOReOS, MOSDEN and
WhereX do not show specific security components for analysis
[61].
3) Virtual Machine (VM) based: [61] classifies middleware
as VM-based the applications that use virtual infrastructure
for the purpose of safe execution. The applications are built
from specialized modules, which can be spread through the
network, where each node runs a VM that interact with
the modules. The middleware application Mate´ [72] has a
system component dedicated to security, its purpose is to block
the propagation of harmful programs through the network.
Other applications, such as VM, Melete, MagnetOS, Squawk,
Sensorware, DVM, DAViM, SwissQM and TinyReef do not
show any specific security features for analysis according to
[61].
4) Agent-based: Agent-based middleware is composed of
modular programs that “facilitate injections and distribution
through the network using mobile agents”. Agent-based mid-
dleware deserve as well a security-focused analysis for features
and vulnerabilities. The application Ubiware [73] adds policies
to support the security requirements of the middleware. Other
solutions, such as Impala, Smart Messages, ActorNet, Agilla,
UbiROAD, AFME, MAPS, MASPOT, and TinyMAPS, do not
present security or privacy demands [61].
5) Tuple-spaces: Tuple-space middleware each component
contains a data repository or tuple space that can be ac-
cessed simultaneously [61]. Applications such as LIME [74],
TinyLIME [75] and TS-Mid [76] do not support any security
or privacy mechanism [61].
6) Database-oriented: The sensor network acts as a “vir-
tual relational database system” that can be queried by SQL-
alike language. Under the security domain, current database-
oriented middleware solutions, such as GSN [77] and HyCache
[78] do not deal with security or privacy requirements. TinyDB
[79] does not show any security feature for analysis according
to [61].
7) Application-specific: Application-specific middleware
specializes on managing resources for specific requirements
demanded by the application or by the domain it works on
[61]. Given the nature of application-specific middleware the
solutions developed under these architecture cannot satisfy
general IoT requirements taken into account in other appli-
cations in terms of heterogeneity, therefore, security demands
cannot be satisfied integrally [61].
C. Application Layer
1) Message Queue Telemetry Transport (MQTT): The char-
acteristics of the various devices used in Internet of Things is
such that they lack the capability to handle high-level protocols
like HTTP. Researchers are more inclined on developing light-
weight protocols that suit the specific characteristics of IoT
devices. The Message Queue Telemetry Transport (MQTT)
proposed by Andy Stanford-Clark, and Arlen Nipper [80]
in 1999 is a light-weight protocol designed for constrained
devices and low-bandwidth, high-latency or unreliable net-
works. The present implementation of MQTT provides support
for only identity, authentication and authorization policies.
Identity specifies the client that is being authorized. Au-
thentication provides identity of the client and authorization
is the management of rights given to the client. The basic
approaches used to support these policies are by using a
username/password pair, which is set by the client, for identi-
fication or by authentication performed by the MQTT server
via client certificate validation through the SSL protocol. The
MQTT server identifies itself with its IP address and digital
certificate. The MQTT communication uses TCP as transport
layer protocol. By itself the MQTT protocol does not provide
encrypted communication. Authorization is also not part of
MQTT protocol. Authorization is provided by MQTT servers.
MQTT authorization rules control which client can connect to
server and what topics a client can publish or subscribe to.
According to Neisse [81] the security controls provided by
MQTT are not sufficient for the IoT network. IoT networks
requires “data anonymization, obfuscation or dynamic context-
based policies that should be dynamically evaluated for each
message forwarded by the broker” [81, p. 1]. Neisse [81]
implements a solution for the enforcement of security at
MQTT layer which is a Model-based Security Toolkit called
SecKit. It addresses the privacy and data protection require-
ment. For secure communication, security mechanisms have
to be adopted over existing MQTT protocol. [82] proposes a
new security solution for MQTT (Secure MQTT or SMQTT)
that replaces the use of SSL/TLS certificates, which are not
necessarily viable in all IoT implementations, the solution
runs over Lightweight Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) over
elliptic curves.
2) Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP):
The Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol is an ap-
plication profile of the Extensible Markup Language (XML)
that enables the near-real-time exchange of structured and
extensible data between any two or more network entities.
The core features of XMPP provide the building blocks for
different types of near-real-time applications, which can be
layered on top of the core by sending application-specific
data qualified by particular XML namespaces [83]. XMPP
architecture is defined by a distributed network of clients
and servers. The recommended ordering of layers in XMPP
described in [83], in order to ensure security is to have TCP,
followed by TLS, SASL and then XMPP. Using XMPP over
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TLS provides confidentiality and integrity to data which is in
motion over the network. Unless the network is protected with
TLS, it is open to attacks. But the XMPP protocol does not
provide end-to-end security. The data is processed in cleartext
on the sender’s and the receiver’s servers. It is also unprotected
when it is sent from sender’s to receiver’s server, or sent from
receiver’s server to receiver’s client. Systems using XMPP
as the enabling technology must ensure that they use secure
protocols along with XMPP. For authentication purposes, the
servers and the clients should support Salted Challenge Re-
sponse Authentication Mechanism (SCRAM). Using both TLS
and SCRAM provides both confidentiality and authentication.
Due to its capability of real-time message exchange, XMPP
is a viable enabling technology for the IoT but XMPP has to
be used in conjunction with the various security protocols to
ensure confidentiality, integrity and authentication of the IoT
system.
3) Blockchain: Blockchain [84] was originally proposed
in Bitcoin to solve the double spending problem in a cryp-
tocurrency system. However, a blockchain can stand by itself
and be applied in a distributed and trustless environment
without the need of third party authentication or management.
In a nutshell, a blockchain is a back-ordered hash list that
is publicly shared in a peer-to-peer network. Usually, each
member in the blockchain system is addressable by the hash
value of its public key. When a new transaction occurs,
the owner of the transaction can prove the authenticity of
the record (i.e. block) by encrypting the hash value of the
record using its private key. The newly formed block is
then appended to the existing blockchain and point to the
previous block. Supported by the cryptographic properties of
hash and asymmetric encryptions, a blockchain can therefore
ensure each block is immutable and transaction is verifiable.
Blockchains has recently received a lot of attentions in the
field of IoT. Researchers and practitioners believe blockchain
is one of the key technologies that can securely enable smart
contracts among the things. That is, smart devices can interact
and transact with each other autonomously without human
interventions. Though it is possible to implement blockchains
in a public network, the computing overhead of providing
proof of work (mining) may overwhelm the limited computing
resources in an IoT network. If on the other hand, participating
members in a blockchain network are not completely trustless,
simple techniques, such as whitelisting, can be leveraged to
reduce the burden of mining and make blockchains much
more desirable in real world practice. It should be noted that,
blockchains offer only pseudo anonymity: it is possible for
adversaries to make inferences about who owns what public
keys. If privacy is a major concern in an IoT system, additional
mechanism must be designed and implemented to prevent the
owners of the smart devices being identified.
V. CONFIDENTIALITY, INTEGRITY, AVAILABILITY AND
PRIVACY CONCERNS FOR IOT SYSTEMS
An upcoming global network of “things” brings challenges
regarding security and privacy. Confidentiality, Integrity and
Availability becomes paramount when exchanging data be-
tween IoT devices, the intelligence and autonomy of these
devices demand further responsibility when protecting against
device corruption and its influence in the network [94]. Differ-
ent cryptographic and process-based solutions are available to
assure and to provision confidentiality, integrity and availabil-
ity, nevertheless, IoT systems demand not only these services,
but also need to focus on how these solutions are executed
and optimized [95], [96], [97], [98].
The IoT relies heavily on wireless networks which are known
to be vulnerable to all type of intrusions including unautho-
rized router access, faulty configurations, jamming, man-in-
the-middle attacks, interference, spoofing, Denial of Service
attacks, brute-force attacks, traffic injections, etc [99]. Accord-
ing to [3, p. 14], security is a main concern for large networks,
therefore, IoT physical components are vulnerable to avail-
ability, confidentiality and integrity attacks. The “first line of
defense” is the application of cryptographic features. Encryp-
tion schemes protect confidentiality as message authentication
codes assures integrity as well as authenticity. Former WSN
implementations, according to [100], used to deal with attack
models that required physical access to the nodes. Eventually,
after opening WSNs to the Internet the threat model changed
as attackers can reach WSNs ubiquitously where sensor nodes
are the most vulnerable due to scarce computational resources.
According to [101], in order to enable massive adoption of
Internet of Things devices; security, including confidentiality,
integrity, availability, and privacy issues must be addressed in
order to make them trustworthy to the public. [101] suggests
as well that there should exist different security levels since the
requirements are not the same between devices. User privacy
and integrity can also be endangered from the lack of data
confidentiality and integrity. Unauthorized access of sensor
data could interfere with the proper functioning of the system,
as well as unauthorized access and control [25].
IEEE standard 802.15.4, which provides guidelines to protect
physical and medium access control layers, may be used as a
instrument to add security features that sum up confidentiality,
integrity and availability properties to the system [25]. The
Internet Draft ID-Tsao [102] signals a high-level presentation
of the existing threats and security countermeasures in terms
of the security triad. [103] indicates a potential limitation of
the framework based on the non-differentiation arguments and
layer 3-only analysis.
A. Confidentiality
[85, p.1505] defines data confidentiality as a “fundamental
issue” for IoT solutions, “particularly relevant in the business
context”. [85] also indicates that current data confidentiality
solutions may not be applicable as is due to two main
limitations: Amount of data generated and the effectiveness
in the control of access to data of dynamic data streams. The
authors in [85] also mention proper identity management as
a key factor to assure data confidentiality. Some IoT devices
need to handle data need to be classified as confidential. Con-
fidentiality, of the communications channel, can be obtained
through encryption schemes. Current symmetric and asymmet-
ric algorithms should be analyzed before implemented based
on the application, capability and the criticality of the IoT
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Enabling Technologies
WSN X X X X X
RFID X X X X X X
Ultra-Wide Band
802.11
Low-Level Protocols
LTE/LTE advanced
NFC X
Bluetooth
6LoWPAN X X X
ZigBee X
High-Level Protocols
MQTT
XMPP
Blockchain
Security Triad
Confidentiality X X X X X X X X
Integrity X X X X X X X
Availability X X X X X X X
AAA
Authorization X X X X X X
Authentication X X X X X X X X X
Accounting X
Privacy X X X X X X X X
system as stated by [104].
Wireless communications of things may be vulnerable to
eavesdropping attacks that may compromise the confidentiality
of the communication which could impact the node or the
network as a whole [103]. [105] emphasizes on the importance
of confidentiality research and the inherent challenges attached
to it. [105] also indicates the importance of authenticity and
the integrity of data groundwork as well. The confidentiality
needed for a sensor data, according to [105], is not as
important as the integrity and authenticity since the attacker
may obtain the same values just by placing a rogue sensor next
to the legitimate one. [94] states that the major confidentiality
sensitivity, in the IoT context, resides in the communication,
storage, localization/tracking, and identification. On the other
hand, sensors, actuators, devices and processing topics are not
as sensitive as the one listed in the first place. [94] believes
that there is adequate research work available for communica-
tion, storage, localization/tracking, and identification subjects,
although, [94] recognizes the complexity of employing current
mechanisms for securing the IoT.
According to [106, p. 4], IoT solutions must use security
mechanisms that permit, based on the end-user decision,
access to a “predefined set of resources”, also called data
ownership. It is needed then a differentiation for the security
requirements of things based on criticality, [107] indicates the
importance on the difference for each of the IoT layers, the link
layer, the network layer and the application layer. Current IoT
technologies manage data security processes, including key
management, which places a burden on IoT resources that may
diminish IoT capabilities and increase risk [108]. [109] pro-
poses the use of lightweight cryptographic algorithms so that
the resource-limited IoT devices, especially for processing and
storage capabilities, can provide data protection and, therefore,
confidentiality. Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
may be used as a solution to confidentiality problems by
providing end-to-end security for the application layer. DTLS
properties may also reduce the impact and the cost of resources
of constrained devices compared to other solutions [103].
In order to protect data and communication confidentiality,
some cloud-based solutions establish secure channels based
on cryptographic features relying on Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI). Information flow control is noted as another solution to
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protect IoT data sharing utilizing a cloud-based platform that
protects critical information as described by [108].
According to [86], privacy of humans and business confi-
dentiality are two major issues to be addressed for the Internet
of Things. Standard encryption schemes may solve the prob-
lem, however, energy and processing resources need to be ef-
ficiently applied, including key distribution mechanisms, to be
considered as a valid IoT solution. Confidentiality and Privacy
are usually tied together, according to [10, p. 622], “Privacy
as confidentiality represents solutions for anonymizing the
collected data (including communications) and minimizing the
collection of data”. [10] also suggests that anonymous commu-
nication, such as hiding location, identity, time, frequency and
volume details, as well as communication context is necessary
to entirely protect traffic data from unauthorized access. [10]
also indicates that in order to increase confidentiality levels
it is important to apply privacy-base designs and privacy-
enhancing technologies to make it possible.
Confidentiality also deals with government regulations and
laws that demand data protection and confidentiality [108].
[110] states that trust is fundamental for users of the IoT as
the information shared by the things and the users will not be
compromised. To do so, the principles of data confidentiality
and security itself must be preserved. According to [85],
data confidentiality, privacy and trust are key factors that can
leverage the widespread adoption of IoT technologies and
applications.
B. Integrity
IoT integrity deals with physical failures and damages at
first sight, Integrity protection includes preservation against
sabotage and the use of counterfeit units or components [111].
Another critical factor that influences data integrity is the
robustness and fault tolerance capabilities of the IoT System
[85]. Sensor networks, such as RFID solutions, face also
other issues that limit their capability to overcome integrity
problems as many of their components spend most of the time
without being attended. Attackers can either modify the data
while it is stored in the node or when it travels through the
network. Read and write protections as well as authentication
methods are common solutions to these issues. Data integrity
is also ensured by password-based solutions, which brings
into account the shortcomings of password protection, such
as vulnerabilities related to password length and randomness.
Also, the resources found in common IoT systems do not
support typical cryptographic solutions because of the limited
resources available [4].
Integrity for the Internet of Things not only is required to be
guarded from external sources but also for internal processes,
such as service integrity. Operating systems rigid process
separation, known as Multi Level Security (MLS), help devices
to avoid unauthorized modification from code running with
high privileges. Nevertheless, MLS approaches have not been
deployed widely as in some cases can be considered as
expensive as well as not compatible with other IoT software.
Other approaches to guarantee integrity use hash values which
are stored externally to avoid compromises [112]. Hardware
solutions have also been proposed for integrity purposes, a
challenge-based solution is mentioned in [112] by the use
of symmetric or asymmetric keys known as Trusted Platform
Module (TPM).
Process integrity is also required by IoT devices, process
integrity relies on the device, communication, and algorithm
implementation integrity. The processing data correctiveness is
highly desired to perform data processing for higher services
and data correlation [94]. Software integrity relies mostly on
hardware isolation of critical code and data from other, less
relevant, internal components and it can be hardware-enforced.
SMART, SPM, SANCUS and Trustlite are some solution
examples applied to devices with limited capabilities in terms
of processing, power and battery life [111]. Nevertheless,
hardware-based attacks, such as fault attacks, can compro-
mise the integrity if the system does not have protections in
place, i.e. perturbation sensors [113]. Integrity verification for
software configuration, called attestation, prevents malicious
modifications and it is usually performed through secure hard-
ware. However, IoT devices are forced to depend on software
attestation which is based on “strong assumptions” that are not
easy to accomplish in practice. Instead, low-end embedded
devices may use “swarn attestation” that allows software
integrity verification collectively from multiple devices or
“provers” [111].
Authentication schemes used in the IoT not only tries to assure
the identity of an object but also attempts to assure its integrity.
Authentication, through Identity Management (IdM) provides
resource control and helps to deliver auditing, accounting and
access control as well. Nevertheless, the implementation of
IdM presents some challenges when deployed in a IoT infras-
tructure after facing scalability, capability and management
issues [112]. Standardized procedures are also important for
ensuring integrity and quality as well. A common scheme
permits the process development to satisfy data trustworthi-
ness and traceability needs. Extensive collaboration between
different IoT institutions and alliances is fundamental [85].
C. Availability
Usual information networks, according to [105, p. 648],
need to guarantee “identification, confidentiality, integrality
and undeniability”, nevertheless, IoT networks that can po-
tentially be utilized in “crucial areas of national economy”,
which need as well to pay special attention to availability
and dependability. According to [114, p. 601], for information
networks, device availability is the “most important factor”.
IoT availability requirements, as specified by [115], are highly
tied to reliability requirements. IoT systems need to display
sufficient resiliency to sustain availability under desired levels
as well as they need to guarantee a certain level of performance
requested by their applications. Availability may also refer
to ubiquitous requirements, [116] proposes that in order for
IoT devices to reach their potential they will need to address
requirements, such as availability, which, by the way, it is
listed as a one of the key challenges to be addressed for the
IoT. [116, p. 2362] also indicates that the availability of the
IoT networks should be performed in hardware and software so
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they can cope with user requirements. “Availability of software
refers to the ability of the IoT applications to provide services
for everyone at different places simultaneously. Hardware
availability refers to the existence of devices all the time that
are comparable with the IoT functionality and protocols”.
According to [59], some constrained devices may face similar
effects as a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack from huge amounts
of legitimate clients’ requests that may hinder the services
provided. Still, current Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
standardized communication protocols, such as Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP), failed to provide solutions and,
therefore, foster IoT network availability.
Denial-of-Service attacks obstruct the communication between
devices and prevent them for accessing network resources.
According to [114], DoS attacks are important security issues
that need to be addressed. DoS attacks can be executed
remotely with simple commands in combination with more
sophisticated tools that may allow the execution of Distributed
Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks as well. DoS attacks against
IoT systems, as exposed by [115], not only deal with tradi-
tional vectors, such as service provider resource and bandwidth
exhaustion but also they can compromise data acquisition
wireless communication from IoT nodes. [105, p. 649] states
that DDoS are “particularly severe” for IoT systems consti-
tuted of vulnerable nodes from a network layer standpoint.
[114] defines the range of DoS attacks, from the simplest one,
such as jamming attacks (the interference of radio signals), to
sophisticated ones, such as elaborated DDoS. DoS and DDoS
attacks not only can affect the availability of network resources
or applications, but also may cause energy dissipation issues,
critical for constrained devices [117]. Physical damage, as
stated by [115], can also be considered a DoS threat executed
by less knowledgeable attackers to cripple IoT services by
“things” destruction.
[117] defines DDoS attacks as the set of concurrent DoS
attacks. Therefore, the authors suggest in their work, a Service
Oriented Architecture (SOA) as a DDoS prevention strategy
for IoT systems. Traditional approaches to prevent DoS or
DDoS attacks rely on heavy network traffic sampling, [117]
proposes an optimized solution based on random sampling
and sampling rate efficiency. [114] lists various DoS defense
techniques for WSN including [118], [103] and [107]. Nev-
ertheless, the authors indicate that there is not an existing
defense mechanism capable of ruling out DoS risks. DoS
attack detection is very difficult to accomplish, according to
[114], since the symptoms of such attacks may also make some
services unavailable. [114], proposes an Intrusion-Detection-
System (IDS) based solution for DoS attack detection. The so-
lution objective is to detect DoS attacks in early stages before
the disruption of normal network operations for 6LoWPAN
solutions. The authors of [115] suggest the implementation
of distributed architectures instead of centralized approaches.
One of the main advantages portrait in the same work, is
the improvement of availability properties in terms of service
uptime as well as eliminating single points of failure. Suo
et al. [105] stress on the importance of disaster recovering
procedures to be placed after large-scale or elaborated DDoS
attacks.
D. Privacy
The significant growth of the IoT has showed during recent
years has brought in several privacy concerns as data availabil-
ity soars, sponsored by ubiquitous and pervasive properties of
the IoT [85] [119], and the fact that devices at the moment do
not offer all the desired warranties. [24] calls for protection of
users’ personal information associated to their “movements,
habits and interactions” [24, p. 151]. Faulty provisioning of
data confidentiality and integrity could influence user privacy
as malicious parties could access sensitive data without any au-
thorization or consent [25] [4], harming as well the possibility
for widespread adoption of IoT technologies [4] [85] [120].
[87] discusses worst-case scenarios and undesirable situations
produced by “Big Brother-like entities” [87, p. 54] were data
is collected and shared without user consent.
[121] distinguishes issues and challenges that the IoT com-
munity needs to address in order to prevent privacy violation,
which includes self-aware behavior of interconnected devices,
data integrity, authentication, heterogeneity tolerance, efficient
encryption techniques, secure cloud computing, data owner-
ship & governance, as well as policy implementation and
management. [87] also proposes solutions to the Iot privacy
problems, the first one is to provide “privacy by design”
[87, p. 64] which advocates for users to have the tools to
dynamically control the data collected, stored and shared,
user’s request should be correlated and evaluated to existing
policies in order to make a decision whether to grant data
access or not [119]. [10] also includes Transparency as a
privacy solution, as it allows users to know the parties that
manage and utilize the data collected by a IoT device. [119]
proposes Data Management as a solution as well, composed
by the implementation of differentiated policies and enforcing
instruments. [119] also discusses the necessity for data typ-
ification as well as ownership, access extent (minimum and
maximum of data to be read), anonymity and its viability.
[4] proposes the implementation of opt-out features managed
by individuals wherever an untrustworthy sensor network
has been implemented, also called “right to silence of the
chips” [16, p. 26], as well the interaction with a “privacy
broker” [122] that acts as a proxy between the user and the
network. [120] indicates that technological solutions are not
enough to address the current privacy issues and calls for the
consideration of economical and socio-ethic aspects of the
IoT environment. [115] includes as well the revision of the
existing privacy regulations at the private and government level
as well as improving the users’ awareness on how sensor-based
devices collect, store and share their information. However, it
is not that simple as stated by [123] as the re-classification
and distinction between regular and Personal Identifiable In-
formation (PII), which can be protected by law, for IoT devices
is still a challenge to overcome. [16] questions whether IoT
privacy regulations should be covered by governmental or by
self-regulatory entities (current trend), government regulations
could be only applicable locally when the nature of IoT
data transcends boundaries and jurisdictions. Nevertheless,
government entities, such as the European Commission and
the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) [10],
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have already called for recommendations in the deployment of
sensor networks as well as the collaboration within the civil
society stakeholders for the creation of a privacy framework
that works at different levels.
VI. IOT SECURITY CHALLENGES AND SOME SOLUTIONS
Different authors with different terminologies coincide on
determining the architectural structure of the IoT. The percep-
tion, the network and the application layer (middleware can be
placed in between the last two layers) constitute what currently
the Internet of Things relay, each one of them provides signif-
icant value to the whole system. These segmentation provides
modularity and helps systems to escalate more efficiently.
However, it also allows malicious entities, in this context
external attackers under the threat model defined, to exploit
vulnerabilities intrinsic to each one of the IoT layers. Each
one of the IoT components of the different layers can be
run on top of separate technologies and, therefore, distinct
weaknesses are found based on functionality and application.
Such vulnerabilities have been exploited in a way that have
compromised millions of IoT devices which have resulted
in the perfect weapon to execute one of the most internet-
disruptive breakdowns in recent times. Even though security
researchers have expressed their concern over the weaknesses
of IoT systems the intrinsic principle of energy efficiency as
well as low computing power available on embedded devices
are in some way antagonistic to the existing cryptography
principles, that means a more challenging environment for the
IoT and its community.
The IoT, then, needs a deeper discussion that strengthens
its foundations towards a secure environment. In order to con-
tribute to this purpose, the authors of this document consider
that further analysis under the security triad (confidentiality,
integrity and availability) is necessary. Also, this work covers
the privacy concerns that the ongoing soaring demand for IoT
devices has brought along. Many IoT experts have raised their
concerns on how “Big Brother-like” entities may collect and
disclose users’ data without consent and how technological and
governance implementations may help to relieve the existing
doubts. As stated, the situation of the IoT under a security
perspective is concerning and proper analysis and consequent
actions are required. The need for integral standards as well as
for more hardware-friendly security implementations is now
of common understanding. Policy is also a priority for user
protection and manufacturer regulation in order to find a more
fertile ground for IoT expansion.
VII. CONCLUSION
The ongoing Internet of Things state reveals that there is still
significant work to do in order to secure embedded computer
devices. Even though the number of IoT devices as well as
new technologies and scientific publications has soared in
the last few years, the security solutions and improvements
have not kept the pace. Publicly-known security breaches
initiation vectors point to vulnerable and/or neglected IoT
devices and the number of records stolen continue to grow.
The amount of data handled by IoT devices is soaring at
exponential rates, which means higher exposure of sensitive
data and brings up the need to foster discussions among
security researchers. Recent efforts have not been able to cover
the entire security spectrum, which reveals research opportu-
nities in different areas including smart object hardening and
detection capabilities. Current issues and challenges should be
taken as improvement opportunities that need to be achieved
under a rigorous process that incorporates security objectives
at early design stages and efficient and effective application
of security standardized solutions at production stages. Final
users, as well, need to understand the main objective of the
device and how to fulfill their requirements under strict control
and scrutiny to manage the always present risk for inter-
connectivity.
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